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Case No. 9120

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

s·TATE OF UTAH

liN-~

LED

STERLING JACOBSON and
TRAL UT:A-H BLOCK COMPANY, ri~ ·R 2 8 1960
a Corporation,
Plaintiffs and

Responden)i~i,~;;:.~· s~;;;:~-;;;~--c~~ri:··u·i~;;----

-vs.-

RALPH MEMMOTT, 1\1:ERRILL G.
MEMMOTT, GRACE K. MEMMOTT
and MARIE S. MEMMOTT,

~

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Intermediate Appeal from the District ·Court of the
Fifth Judicial District in and for Millard County.
Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge

GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
MATTSSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STERLING JACOBSON and CENTRAL UTAH BLOCK CO~iP ANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

Case No.

9120

RALPH MEl\iMOTT, MERRILL G.
~IE:\LMOTT, GRACE K. MEMMOTT
and :MARIE S. MEJ\IMOTT,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

This is a condemnation proceeding to secure to plaintiffs a surface right-of-way across defendants' mining
property in order to facilitate the mining of plaintiffs'
property, which property is adjacent to that of the defendants. Believing, as we do, that defendants ( appellants herein) have misconceived the issues, and in order
that the same be more precisely stated, it is appropriate
to restate the facts.
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STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS
Defendants have been pennitted to take an interrnediate appeal from an order of the District Court of
Millard County, Utah, entered on July 10, 1959 (R.
28-32), denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint as the same was further amended at the
hearing reflected by the order. The arnended complaint
(R. 12-13) denominates the plaintiff's mining claim as
the "Red Robin" and the defendants' adjoining mining
claim as the "Red I-Iill." The amendments permitted by
the trial court are set forth in the order of July 10,
1959, and are incorporated in the amended cmnplaint
by reference. In other words, the amended complaint
and the order permitting the further amendments must
be read together to determine the propriety of the
motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the order appealed
from permitted plaintiffs to further amend by adding
as Exhibit 4 the map showing the course of the center
line of the present existing roadway across defendants'
claim.
The order of July 10, 1959, grants to plaintiffs a
surface right-of-way to be used jointly with the defendants across the existing roadway upon the condition
"that when it becomes necessary for the defendants to
mine the cinders lying under said right-of-way, and
upon reasonable notice from the defendants, plaintiffs
will move said right-of-way to smne other feasible place
over defendants' claim" (R. 31-32). The amendments
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to the amended complaint as reflected in the July lOth
order are:
(Paragraph 5)
"Plaintiffs are entitled to have a right-of-way
for the purposes hereinbefore set forth over the
premises known as the Red 1-lill :ro.Jining Claim
for the purposes of transporting their ore and
supplies to and from the 1nining operations over
the present existing road, which is approxilnately
one rod wide, or if defendants so desire, over
the present and proposed road that should be
approximately the same "'idth, and which road
or roads 1nay be used jointly by the occupants
or individuals joining Red Hill Mining Clain1,
and that plaintiffs will move from the present
existing road to any other feasible road across
defendants' 1nining claim upon receiving reasonable notice to do so and having an opportunity
to construct such road when it becomes necessary
for defendants to mine the cinders lying unde.r
said road or roads." (R. 28-29)
(Paragraph 3 of the prayer)
"That upon the payment of the value of the
same plaintiffs be granted a perpetual right of
way and easement over and across said lands as
set forth in the complaint, provided, however,
that if it becomes necessary in the mining operations of defendants' claims to remove the material
under said right-of-way that upon reasonable notice, plaintiffs will move the right-of-way to any
other feasible place over defendants' claim."
(R. 29)
Defendants contend (a) that their property is already appropriated to the same public use proposed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by plaintiffs, and. (b) the cornplaint does not specify
the land to be condemned but sets forth a claim to a
"floating" or "variable" right-of-way, and therefore the
action should be dismissed.
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY IS ALREADY APPROPRIATED TO A PUBLIC USE REQUIRING
PROOF BY PLAINTIFFS OF A MORE NECESSARY PUBLI·C USE MISCONCEIVES THE ISSUE INVOLVED.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS AMENDED BY THE
ORDER OF JULY 10, 1959, STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
ARGU~iENT

POINT I.
THE CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY IS ALREADY APPROPRIATED TO A PUBLIC USE REQUIRING
PROOF BY PLAINTIFFS OF A MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE MISCONCEIVES THE ISSUE INVOLVED.

Unless it be the existing roadway, there is no suggestion in this case that any of defendants' property
is devoted to public use within the connotation of Subsection (3) of Section 78-34-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953, which reads :
"The private property which may be taken
under this chapter includes:
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(3) Property appropriated to public use;
provided, that such property shall not be taken
unless for a more necessary public use than that
to which it has been already appropriated."
The right-of-wa~· granted by the order appealed
from is centered along a present existing roadway on
defendants' property, the right to be used in comnwn
with the defendants. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the present roadway has becmne dedicated
or appropriated to public use, the plaintiffs are not
proposing a taking which is inconsistent or in interference with or an impairment of the first taking, and
there defendants' arguinent is not applicable. In 2 Lewis
Eminent Domain, Section 4-tl, Third Edition, it is said:
"The general rule is founded upon the presuinption that the legislature did not intend, by
a general grant of the eininent domain power,
to authorize an interference with the enjoyment
of property devoted to public use under prior
grants of the same power. A taking which is no
interference present or prospective with the prior
use, is not within the rule. Consequently it is
generally held that an easement or joint use may
be appropriated, where the two uses are not inconsistent and the second is no interference with
or impairment of the first. Taking an easement
for a telegraph or telephone line upon a railroad
right of way is a familiar example.''
In Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec.
Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672, it is said:
"Under the statutes of eminent domain
the law seems to be well settled that, where two
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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public uses can stand together without material
impairment or impediment of one by the other,
they must so stand. This court so held in Postal
TeL Cable Co. v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 23 Utah
474, 65 Pac. 735. In deciding a like question in
the case of Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston
& ,V. R. Corp., 23 Pick. 360, Mr. Chief Justice
Shaw said: 'Both uses may well stand together,
with some interference of the later with the
earlier, which may be compensated for in damages.' Lewis, Em. Dom. Section 27 4; ~fining oCo.
v. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 147; Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6
How. 507, 12 L. Ed. 535; In re Towanda Bridge
Co., 91 Pa. 216; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N.H.R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, -1-1 A1n. Dec. 556."
The Utah statute was construed in Freeman Gulch
Min. Co. v. J(ennecott Copper Corp. (10 Cir., 1941), 119
F.2d 16:
"A statute granting the right of eminent domain for a particular purpose must be liberally
construed in furtherance of such purpose. Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol.
Mining Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172, 175.
While we think the facts demonstrate beyond
question that the use for which Kennecott seeks
condemnation is a more necessary public use
than the use to which the property is being devoted by Freeman, the question of greater necessity is not involved where the condemner seeks
the right to use the property in common with
the present owner thereof. Monetaire Mining Co.
v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mining Company,
supra, 174 P. 176.
We shall assume, but not decide, that the
property here . sought to .be condemned is now
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devoted to a public use. It is well settled that
property devoted to one public use may, under
general statutory authority, be taken for another
public use, where the taking will not materially
iinpair or interfere with, or is not inconsistent
with the use already existing. Such a taking is
expressly authorized by Section 104-61-3 ( 5) ."
In Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 23
Utah 474, 65 P. 735, the contest was between the Postal
Company and the Railway Company, the former seeking a right-of-way for a pole line upon the railroad
right-of-way. In holding that the reference to the railroad bed is a sufficient description under the statute,
and that the business of telegraphy is obviously a
public business and that the Postal Company had the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain, the
Court stated, as between the two possible conflicting uses
of the property sought to be condemned, the following:
"It is contended by appellant that the respondent had no power to locate its telegraph
line longitudinally upon appellant's right of way,
because, when the lands have been once taken,
by virtue of the power of eminent domain or
otherwise, and appropriated to a public use, as
is the right of way in controversy, such land cannot again be subjected to another public use,
unless such secondary appropriation be authorized by the legislature. The authorities, however,
affirm that this rule only applies when the second
public use, by reason of its nature or character,
necessarily supersedes or destroys the former
use.''
In the instant case the existing roadway over the
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defendants' mining claim, if appropriated to public use,
is to be used in common with defendants for the same
purposes, namely: that of transporting ore and supplies,
a use which does not supersede or destroy the former
use. The early case of Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. v.
Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, holds that the construction and operation of roads for the development
and working of mines is a public use, the Court stating
in part:
"Now, it is of vital importance to the people
that the coal, as well as the Dther hidden resources
of the state, be opened up and developed, and
that the mining industry in general, which has
been the source of so much wealth to the people
of this and other Western states, be conducted
on the sarne extensive scale in the future that has
characterized its operations in the past. Therefore the public policy of the state, as exemplified
by the act of the Legislature under consideration,
is to encourage the people to open up and exploit
the mines with which the state abounds, and thereby not only give to the state the wealth which will
enable other industries to be created, but furnish
thousands of laborers with remunerative employrnent.
It being conceded, and this court having held,
that the construction and operation of irrigating
ditches in this state is a public use (Nash v. Clark,
27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371), it follows that the construction of roads and tramways for the development of the mining industry is a public use, as
the same line of reasoning that applies in support of the doctrine in the one case holds good
in the other."
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Defendants' resistance to the use by the plaintiffs
of the present existing roadway implies a private use
and one that they might discontinue at their pleasure.
In this regard 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, Section 445,
Third Edition, states:
"Property of individuals and private eorporations devoted to a use of a public nature for
which the power of eminent domain might be
exercised, but which use is purely voluntary and
may be discontinued at the pleasure of the owner,
is subject to condemnation under a general power
the same as if devoted to private uses."
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS AMENDED BY THE
ORDER OF JULY 10, 1959, STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

Subsection (5) of Section 78-34-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, containing the language that all rights-of-way
for the purposes mentioned in Section 78-34-1, which
latter section permits the exercise of the right of eminent don1ain for roads to facilitate the working of mines
or mineral deposits, and Subsection ( 1) of Section 7834-2 to the effect that when the surface ground is
underlaid with minerals sufficiently valuable to justify
extraction a perpetual easement may be taken only
over the surface ground over such deposits, and the
last portion of Subsection ( 5) of Section 78-34-3 "but
such uses of crossings, intersections and connections
shall be made in the manner most compatible with the
greatest public benefit and the least private injury,"
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invite the amendment to paragraph 5 of the complaint
permitted by the July lOth order (R. 28-32).
Defendants say that the amendment contemplates
"a floating or variable right-of-way" and therefore the
complaint as amended does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. On the contrary, the amendment is calculated to mitigate the damage and injury
to the defendants. It recognizes the joint use of the
present existing road and permits a change upon reasonable notice by the defendants when it becomes necessary for thmn to mine the cinders underlying the existing
road, the court to then determine another feasible
right-of-way across defendants' property. Said Section
78-34-2(1) pennits only a surface right under the circumstances indicated and by necessary implication permits the mining of the underlying minerals by the
defendants, leaving to the resourcefulness of a court of
equity within its inherent power to devise a rule flexible
and elastic enough to fairly and justly meet the circumstances of the case. This is what the trial court
did by permitting the an1endment.
Defendants cite Tripp v. Bagley, 7-! Utah 57, 276
P. 912, to the effect that an easement once selected
cannot be changed by either the lando·wner or the easement owner without mutual consent. The Trvpp case is
not in point and deals primarily with the establishment
of boundary lines by acquiescence over a long period
of time. Furthermore, the amendment to the complaint
in the instant case does not suggest any arbitrary
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or coercive right on the part of the plaintiffs, but
recognizes the comprehensive and equitable power of
the court to make such changes in the surface rightof-way as may be feasible upon the defendants desiring
to mine the underlying mineral, if any there be.
From their brief defendants seem to be prejudging
their position with respect to damages, an issue expressly reserved by the trial court in the July lOth
order. They lose sight of the fact that the statute contemplates a joint user of the right-of-way and an equitable method of determining the compensation based
upon all of the known facts and circumstances and such
as to reflect justice in the instant case. The joint use
and inherent power of the court to devise a fonnula
for compensation based upon the realities of each case
is clearly recognized by this ·Court in M onetaire M tning
Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413,
17 ± P. 172, where the Court stated:
"Counsel, however, state that there is no way
to determine what the compensation shall be to
the owner. It is, however, well settled that, where
property may be condemned for the purpose of
a joint use or a use in common, the whole matter
of determining what is a reasonable compensation
under all the circumstances, as well as the regulations respecting the use of the property, is
determined and regulated according to the rules
of equity. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.)
Section 423.

•••
In view that the business of mining is necessarily highly speculative ; that the prices- of most
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metals are fluctuating so that to mine a certain
grade of ore may be profitable this year while
the price may be so much lower the next that it
would be ruinous to attempt to mine it; that the
contemplated ore bodies 1nay be much smaller in
extent than was expected; and numerous other
things that might be mentioned - the joint use
of a mining tunnel of necessity must be temporary
only. It is for that reason that some equitable
method of determining and fixing the compensation for the joint use must be devised which must
be based upon all the known facts and circumstances, and must be such as to reflect justice
in each case. To fix the compensation in a lump
sum might defeat the very end in view. Some just
method of compensation is all the law contemplates, and that is all that can be required in
each case. It is manifest that in this case no
effort whatever was made by appellant and respondent to arrive at an understanding regarding
either the character or extent of compensation,
nor with regard to the nature and extent of the
use of the tunnel by appellant; and it is equally
manifest that so long as the respondent can
treat the tunnel in question as its own private
affair, to which no one may gain access except
by its consent, no such an understanding or
agreen1ent is possible."
Consistent \Yith the foregoing is the recent expression by this Court in re W nter Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, ________ Ptah ........ , 348 P.2d 679 (Feb.
26, 1960 Advance Sheet), states:
"The inherent power always exists in a Court
of equity for devising new and more adequate
remedies if the facts of the case justify such
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action, and does not conflict with the law. The
equitable jurisdiction of the court is and should
be flexible, elastic enough to meet changing conditions and problems.''
CONCLUSION
The JJI onetaire 1lli,ning Co. case, supra, which recognizes the joint use of a mining tunnel, the use of which
of necessity must be temporary, coupled with the expre~sions of this Court in recognizing the inherent power
of the trial court to make its orders and decrees flexible
and elastic enough to Ineet changing conditions and
problems, and the recognition by the legislature that
the exercise of the right of eminent domain must be
compatible with the greatest public benefit and the
least private injury, answers the important question
in this case dealing with the propriety of the amendments complained of. The order of July 10, 1959, discloses a conscientious judicial approach to the practical
solution of an awkward problem, leaving a just method
of compensation for future determination.
The order appealed from should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
MATTSSON,

Attorneys for
Respondents

Plaint~ffs

and
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